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Management decision making methods frequently adopt quanti-
tative models of several criteria that bypass the question of why
some criteria are considered more important than others, which
makes more difficult the task of delivering a transparent view
of preference structure priorities that might promote ethics and
learning and serve as a basis for future decisions. To tackle this
particular shortcoming of usual methods, an alternative qualita-
tive methodology of aggregating preferences based on the rank-
ing of criteria is proposed. Such an approach delivers a simple
and transparent model for the solution of each preference con-
flict faced during the management decision making process. The
method proceeds by breaking the decision problem into ‘two cri-
teria – two alternatives’ scenarios, and translating the problem of
choice between alternatives to a problem of choice between crite-
ria whenever appropriate. The unicriterion model method is illus-
trated by its application in a car purchase and a house purchase
decision problem.
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Introduction
Whether as a profession or a survival tool kit, decision making is
part of our lives and most of the times there is not much to wonder
about it: we just do what we have to do. Sometimes, however, the
path to follow is not so clear for some reason. Maybe because the
decisions are more complex, with us having several goals at the same
time and not knowing which of them to give up on, since there is no
alternative that satisfies them fully. Or maybe the decision is not so
complex (with so many factors) but we simply lack a gut feeling that
enlightens our spirit to go in a certain direction.
One way or the other, a little more rationale is often of much use,
not only to help finding out which way to go, but also to make it
possible that in the future, one knows why a certain decision has
been made, and replaces eventual regret with learning.
Decision analysis has been finding ways to make clear and com-
plete to us what is at stake (gather all objectives or criteria), valuate
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each decision alternative according to these criteria, decide which
criteria are more important (since probably they won’t all have the
same importance) and decide upon a course of action based on the
judgement of how ready we are to give up on some objectives – cri-
teria – to reach others to a greater extent.
To help managers and decision makers in general identify the best
course of action between several alternatives, Multicriteria Decision
Making methods are used when multiple criteria are necessary to
evaluate each alternative across different value dimensions.
As a fundamental piece of theory in classical multicriteria analysis,
Multiattribute Utility Theory (mut) is based on the assumption that
in any decision problem there exists a real valued function U that
aggregates a set of criteria, and which the decision maker wishes
to maximize (Roy and Vincke 1981, 209). This kind of approach is
essentially numerical and puts forward a weighted sum for the ag-
gregation of scaled utility functions (Dubois et al. 2001, 1).
For the purpose of illustrating our views, the classical approach
of Multiattribute Value Theory (mvt) – as the particular case of mut
without uncertainty – will be considered as representative of the typ-
ical quantitative multicriteria approach.
Several methods are available, but multicriteria applications fre-
quently might be described as sharing a value tree of criteria obeying
certain characteristics (Goodwin and Wright 1991, 12) and compre-
hending the following three step sequence (Bana e Costa and Thore
2002, 30–38):
• Structuring – when one identifies the points of view that deter-
mine the preference structure of the decision-maker;
• Evaluation – when a value measure is associated with each al-
ternative through the definition and application of criteria that
measure each alternative’s impact according to each point of
view;
• Criteria weights determination and aggregation – when one solves
the problem through the application of a quantitative preference
aggregation model (typically additive) across the criteria.
The most common elaboration of the previous approach 3rd step
– Criteria weights determination and aggregation – usually consists
of two activities: First assign quantitative weights to each of the de-
cision criteria, which can be decided according to several different
procedures (Bana e Costa and Thore 2002, 38) and leads each cri-
terion to hold a weight described (for example) by a percentage of
a magnitude proportional to its importance, such that the sum of all
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the weights totals 100%; Second, to obtain the overall value of each
alternative, multiply its value according to each criterion (also ex-
pressed on a scale from 0 to 100) by the respective criterion weight
and add the procedure and its result across all the criterion. The final
value of alternative A will therefore be something like:
V(A)=∑
i
wiVi(A), (1)
where i stands for each decision criterion, wi stands for the weight
of criteria i (between 0 and 1) and Vi(A) stands for the value of alter-
native A according to criterion i (from 0 to 100).
Naturally we also have that
∑
i
wi =1. (2)
Scope and Basis for an Alternative Approach
In spite of its solid establishment and widespread use, criteria
weights determination and aggregation quantitative approaches
(like the one previously presented as an example) have some mod-
elling limitations that an alternative way of tackling the problem
might help overcome, finding its place in the wide range of decision
making methods. That is the scope of this paper.
The first and major aspect to note is that multicriteria preference
aggregation models like the one exemplified are not keen on clarify-
ing what was in the basis of the decision. The decisionmaker ends up
with a formula rather than a model. Despite being operational and
giving an answer, quantitative additive preference aggregation mod-
els can not be fully understood, as they do not observe one major
characteristic of models – the fact that they should exhibit explicit
explanations, if possible identifying relations that resemble cause-
effect relations. This limitation is of major importance if one consid-
ers that when a decision maker needs help to overcome complexity
and reach a decision, his/her problemmight not be to discover which
alternative is best – they should already be quite equivalent in value
to the decision maker, otherwise there wouldn’t be a decision prob-
lem – but instead, to discover a reason, a conceptual view of why
one alternative should be selected, something resembling a theory
that one can learn from and improve in future decisions, that can
not be manipulated as criteria weights can, and that, without loss of
explanatory coherence, observes one of the characteristics a model
necessarily obeys – to be simpler than the subject domain it repre-
sents (Jacobson 1995, 8).
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As a starting point for this paper we will therefore state the fol-
lowing empirical claim:
claim 1 Decision making problems are problems where the global
value of the different alternatives (considering the value dimen-
sions relevant to the decision maker) is quite similar between them.
Given this claim, it is easy to advocate that a methodology focused
on the quantification of the value measures of each alternative might
not always be what the decision makers are looking for. The linear
combination of criteria coming out of that method quantitatively ex-
presses one unexplained ranking of criteria – there is no explanation
for why some criteria are consideredmore important than others – as
well as it expresses a ranking impossible to distinguish from several
other similar rankings (with small differences in the weights) there-
fore not obeying the expected character of uniqueness of a model.
Some approaches have been put forward in trying to devise qual-
itative multicriteria decision methods: the voting system of multi-
agent decision making (Dubois et al. 2001, 1) or the Electre method
(Roy and Vincke 1981, 210), which somehow resembles a voting sys-
tem with criteria as voters. However, both of them assume a quanti-
tative model of criteria aggregation assigning weights to each crite-
rion.
The opportunity emerges for an alternative approach to deal with
conflicting decision making preferences and that is the case for this
paper: to come up with a qualitative solution for resolving the con-
flicts between preference judgements across different criteria and
aggregate them towards a final decision based on a model alterna-
tive to the quantitative additive one.
Multicriteria applications, previously described as having the 3
step sequence, could be approached by transferring the focus from
a problem of choice between alternatives to a problem of choice
between criteria. In fact, if a certain level of indifference between
alternatives is verified (as happens, for example, with incomplete
preferences – Hansson 2005, 16) then the two-alternative and two-
criteria simplified problem is one of deciding between one alterna-
tive performing better according to one criterion, and one alternative
performing better according to the other. These scenarios should
be common, since the alternatives are eventually chosen for their
matching competitiveness.
In such a context, whenever one decides to prefer one alternative
it is because the criterion it performs best in was found more im-
portant than the other (the value difference between alternatives in
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that criterion means more to the decision maker). This problem can
thus be alternatively formulated as a problem of choice between the
two criteria. In fact, if a priority is found for one of the criteria, one
reaches a solution (an increase in the criterion’s weight moves the
balance towards the alternative that excels in that criterion). There-
fore, the search is for a ‘reason’ for one criterion to be considered
more important than the other. Such a reason is another criterion,
or more generally a point of view, and that is the model we are look-
ing for – the unicriterion model. The guarantee that such a point of
view exists comes from the fact that if it did not, the priority be-
tween criterion could not have been established. If one criteria is (or
becomes) more important to the decision maker than other, there is
always a reason for that, somewhere in the decision maker’s prefer-
ence structure of values.
Therefore we state claim 2:
claim 2 Whenever the decision maker finds that one criterion is
more important than another, behind that preference there is al-
ways a higher (abstraction) level criterion (which we call the uni-
criterion model) such that the corresponding point of view ranks
the other two criteria accordingly.
This approach can be generalized to problems of several alterna-
tives and criteria, where the focus of the analysis is no longer the
quantification of value preferences, but the modelling of criteria in
order to organize them and, whenever necessary, rank them. Pri-
orities between criteria are possible to reach, since for each pair of
criteria weights comparison in the criteria aggregation procedures of
mvt wemight find the point of view according to which one criterion
proves to be more important than the other. One of the advantages
of this approach is not having to quantify such a judgement. To dis-
tinguish both approaches the following hypothesis is stated:
hypothesis 1 The human mind is able to say it prefers one crite-
rion or alternative over another, but not how many times it does.
By this hypothesis (in terms of criteria) we mean that if a crite-
rion’s importance is equivalent to the difference in attractiveness
between the best and the worst alternative according to that crite-
rions solely, then the human mind can say that it prefers criterion
A to criterion B (criterion A is found more important because one
prefers changing from the worst to the best alternative in that cri-
terion than making the same change in criterion B), but the human
mind can not say how many times it finds criterion A more impor-
tant than criterion B – if it is two or three times (for example) more
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important. In other words, we mean that the quantification of the
difference in attractiveness between changing from the worst to the
best alternative in each criterion is not a natural thing to do.
To test Hypothesis 1 we suggest the realization of an experiment
to establish whether the relative importance of criteria perceived by
the mind is solely an ordering procedure or whether it has a cardinal
(quantifiable) intrinsic nature. Taking a pool of respondents, some
alternatives and a few criteria (at least five), and taking a criterion’s
importance to be equivalent to the difference in attractiveness be-
tween the best and the worst alternative according to that criterion,
each respondent would first be asked to order the criteria in terms of
their relative importance. Next, each respondent would express the
importance of all the criteria as a percentage (in multiples of 10) of
the major criteria importance (valued as 100%). Later on, the respon-
dents would be asked to refer to the second most important criterion
(provided that it had an importance smaller than 100% in the previ-
ous step, otherwise choose the third, and so on) and, without having
access to their previous ratings, rate again the importance of all the
criteria (except for the most important) now as a percentage (in mul-
tiples of 10) of the second best criteria importance (now valued as
100%). This should be repeated progressively taking the third most
important criteria as a reference and so on until one reached the
less important criteria. If once converted to the same common scale
of the importance relative to the major criteria, the criteria weights
quantitatively agree (considering a maximum error margin of 5%)
between the different reference rating procedures, that means that
the same (quantitative) perception was reached in the several eval-
uations and its quantitative character can be captured. Otherwise,
Hypothesis 1 would be true, as we expect.
The emphasis of our approach is therefore placed on the mod-
elling of the pertinent reality in analysis, which is the mental struc-
ture of preferences between criteria rather than a set of quantita-
tive trade-offs between them. One outcome of the methodology is
the reduction of all the decision criteria to one single dimension of
value, or point of view, which approximately represents the decision
model. It is noticeable that such a procedure of dimension reduction
is already adopted in multiattribute utility theory, however without
clearly making explicit whatever dimension that is – what particular
value or point of view lies behind the overall greatest attractiveness
of a certain course of action as the one that solves the conflict be-
tween fundamental objectives.
Besides its simplicity advantages, the idea of reducing the deci-
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sion criteria to one single point of view on the top of a pyramid-
like structure seems to follow the biological trace of decision mak-
ing mechanisms in human beings. As we know by now, when fac-
ing a decision, the individual’s emotions play an important role in
the operational search for preference structures in the memory. Ac-
cording to Damásio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Dunn, Dalgleish,
and Lawrence 2006, 241), the scenarios that the mind selects as can-
didates for a decision are filtered with the help of emotions into a
single one as the result of a biological optimization process that pre-
dicts and evaluates on the common dimension of ‘biasing body sig-
nals’ the different scenarios impact, in a way that might be consid-
ered equivalent to an ordering of decision making criteria or value
dimension preferences. These scenarios must be tied to the neural
machinery underlying emotions, resembling criteria rather than just
alternatives, otherwise their abstraction level would not be enough
to serve in multiple decision situations, and they should also resem-
ble the kind of points of view on the top of the pyramid-like struc-
ture we are trying to achieve in our approach’s applications, mak-
ing us confident in that the proposed methodology elaborates on the
same potential of preference structure search mechanisms that na-
ture provided us with. If these natural mechanisms sometimes can-
not be applied straightforward, in complex scenarios or scenarios
(criteria) with which we have had no experience, we can still go to
an upper level of values and apply for our experience with points of
view that order them.
Unicriterion Model Method
In figure 1 we define the new method proposed as an alternative
to the preference determination and criteria aggregation procedures
usually applied in mvt.
Application and Results
hypothetical decision problem
i) To illustrate the method, with all variables and values having been
defined previously to the methodology application, a typical decision
situation was considered, a car purchase choice between three alter-
natives: A, B and C. As a result of the structuring phase the following
decision criteria were defined as the ones relevant to the decision
maker:
• Technical performance (motor, speed, etc.)
• Environmental impact
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1. Choose a new pair
of alternatives
Are there any?
2. Check out if there are
conflicting criteria for those
alternatives
Identify the best
alternative
3. Proceed with criteria
aggregation one level in pairs,
if possible based on concept
proximity between
non-conflicting criteria
4. Rank the alternatives in
each new criteria; start by
selecting a pair of aggregated
criteria and test if they are
conflicting
Order the alternatives
in the corresponding
new criteria
Apply the Unicriteria Model to rank
aggregated criteria and identify best
alternative accordingly
Check if there are more
criteria pairs to work out
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
YesNo
figure 1 Steps of the Unicriteria Model procedure
• Costs (considering both acquisition, fuel and maintenance costs
for the expected lifetime of the car)
• Safety
• Comfort
• Space
To proceed to the evaluation phase, an ordinal scale was consid-
ered for each criterion, such that the value of each alternative ac-
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table 1 Evaluation of three car acquisition alternatives according to six criteria
Criteria/
Alter-
natives
Technical
performance
Environ-
mental
impact
Costs Safety* Comfort Space
Car A Holds 100
km per hour
in the Mon-
santo Hill
165 g/km
of co2
emis-
sions
50,000 BC Excellent
Safety –
Highly rec-
ommended
Equivalent to
a 4 star Hotel
Car
Car B Holds 120
km per hour
in the Mon-
santo Hill
180 g/km
of co2
emis-
sions
40,000 BC Good Safety
with a Mi-
nus – Rec-
ommended
together with
other choices
Equivalent to
a 3 star Hotel
Car
Car C Holds 90 km
per hour in
the Mon-
santo Hill
130 g/km
of co2
emis-
sions
52,000 BC Good Safety
– Recom-
mended
Equivalent to
a 3 star Hotel
Wagon
*Based on the Overall Ratings Safety Scale used by SafeCarGuide.com
cording to that criterion was made as meaningful and explicit as pos-
sible. As a result, table 1 resumes the evaluation of the alternatives.
Provided the decision maker still cannot establish a preference
between pairs of alternatives or eliminate any of them – which is the
case (each alternative excels in two criteria and satisfies minimum
levels in the others) – the assumption of facing a decision making
problem holds and one proceeds to the step of the mcdm methodol-
ogy that this paper focuses on in particular – preference determina-
tion and aggregation between criteria.
ii) According to figure 1 the process starts with the selection of alter-
natives A and B (1.), for which there are conflicting criteria (2.), and
therefore one proceeds with criteria aggregation (3.).
Through criteria aggregation one builds the pyramid like structure
from bottom-up, using the unicriterion approach whenever neces-
sary to rank alternatives in the new criteria.
The most convenient way to aggregate criteria would be to include
in the same group all those criteria that share a certain alternative
as their best one. However, that sometimes conflicts with a ‘concept
proximity’ rule, which should be prevalent given the importance of
making correct aggregations. For this reason, comfort and safety, for
example, went to separate groups of criteria in spite of sharing car A
as their best alternative.
number 2 · summer 2011 135
Fernando Guilherme Silvano Lobo Pimentel
Efficiency
Technical
Performance Costs
Future Life
Preservation
Environmen-
tal Impact
Safety
Capacity and Quality
of Transport
Comfort Space
figure 2 First step of criteria aggregation
Once aggregated as described in figure 2, the new criteria require
an ordering of the alternatives on its own scale and a re-evaluation of
the alternatives’ comparative value in the new conceptual reference
level.
In the next step of the methodology (4.) alternatives A and B are
immediately ranked in the new criteria since none of the three pairs
of aggregated criteria is conflicting. In each of all the three cases
there is always one alternative that dominates over the other one in
both of the original criteria – see figure 3.
Since the information associated with the alternatives is still the
same – for example the efficiency of car A consists of Holding 100 km
per hour in the Monsanto Hill and costing 50,000 BC – one assumes
that the condition of preferential indifference between alternatives
remains. Therefore the process goes on after returning to step 2 of
the methodology (2.), since the alternatives have been ranked for all
pairs of aggregated criteria.
Having only three criteria in step 3 (3.), since there seem to be
no more obvious aggregatable concepts for non-conflicting criteria,
one can now choose one pair of conflicting ones and try to order the
alternatives in a new virtual criterion that would aggregate them.
By choosing the criteria ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Future Life Preservation’,
one proceeds to step 4 (4.) without any need to identify the virtual
criterion for now, and one asks the decision maker whether he/she
prefers changing from car A to car B or vice-versa considering only
these two criteria. The question could be formulated in these terms:
Efficiency Future Life
Preservation
Capacity and Quality
of Transport
B
A
A
B
A
B
figure 3 Ranking alternatives A and B with the new criteria
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figure 4
Unicriterion model that ranks
criteria ‘Future Life
Preservation’ and ‘Efficiency’
Delay of
Gratification
Future Life Preservation
Efficiency
‘Would you prefer changing from an efficiency of “Holding 100 km
per hour in the Monsanto Hill and costing 50,000 BC” to an efficiency
of “Holding 120 km per hour in the Monsanto Hill and costing 40,000
BC”, knowing that in terms of future life preservation it would cost
you an increase from 165 g/km to 180 g/km of co2 emissions and a
decrease from excellent to good in terms of safety? Or would you
prefer not to make such a change?’
Considering the answer to be no for both hypotheses, the deci-
sion maker cannot distinguish between them, which means that the
value difference of the alternatives in one criterion is quantitatively
indistinguishable from the value difference of the alternatives in
the other, maybe because it is difficult to compare value differences
across different dimensions.
To tackle such a difficulty, and since the criteria are conflicting
(there is a decision problem) as represented in figure 1 scheme, it
is time for the application of the unicriterion model between these
two criteria. Once searched and found, a new point of view – a per-
spective that orders the criteria in relative importance and that one
consents to be the right perspective to adopt – the ranking of the cri-
teria leads to a ranking of the alternatives, since the quantitatively
indistinguishable value difference of both alternatives from one cri-
terion to the other is replaced by a sensed qualitative difference be-
tween the same value differences or criteria (the value difference
between alternatives are considered equivalent to the criterion itself
since that is what defines it – reality gives meaning to the concept
and not the opposite way around (Wittgenstein 1995, 5)).
The new criterion chosen to order ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Future Life
Preservation’ is a behavioural point of view called ‘Delay of Grati-
fication’ – see figure 4.
Since the criterion ‘Future Life Preservation’ becomes more im-
portant, the value difference between alternatives A and B in this
criterion becomes also more important than the same difference in
the criterion ‘Efficiency.’ The conclusion is that in light of the new
point of view the decision maker prefers to change from B to A in
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table 2 Value of alternatives A and B across the criteria ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Future
Life Preservation’
Criteria /Alternatives Efficiency Future Life Preservation
Car A 0 100
Car B 100 0
‘Future Life Preservation’ in spite of the cost of changing from B
to A in ‘Efficiency.’ Therefore the decision maker prefers A to B in
terms of Future Life Preservation and Efficiency.
Another way to reach the same conclusion from the quantitative
perspective would be to consider the initial ranking situation be-
tween the two criteria. In a typical Multiattribute Value Theory ap-
plication, like the Simple Multi-attribute Rating Technique – smart
(Edwards 1971), one would have the situation described in table 2,
adopting for each criterion the same scale from 0 (minimum) to 100
(maximum) for convenience reasons in order to calculate the criteria
weights.
Following the ‘swing weights’ attributes weights determination
technique used in smart, since the decision maker was unable to
decide between changing from A to B in ‘efficiency’ or changing
from B to A in ‘future life preservation’, this meant that the weight
of each criterion was 50%, and through the application of the additive
model one would obtain the same value of 50 for each alternative.
Returning to our qualitative approach, through the application of
the unicriterion model the situation changes. One can now valuate
Future Life Preservation’s weight above Efficiency’s weight (though
one cannot say how much). Since the value of each alternative main-
tains, alternative A becomes preferable and we have eliminated step
4 (4.)
Returning to step 2 (2.), there is no conflict between criteria. Since
both ‘capacity and quality of transport’ and the virtual criterion that
aggregates ‘efficiency’ and the ‘future life preservation’ value alter-
native A over alternative B, A is globally preferable.
iii) To proceed with the decision making process one would now
compare alternatives A and C (1.).
Since there are conflicting criteria one proceeds to step 3 (3.), and
taking advantage of the previous aggregation of criteria, step 4 (4.)
comes next.
In terms of Efficiency, A dominates C in both of the original crite-
ria, so there are no conflicting criteria.
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figure 5
Unicriterion model that ranks
criteria ‘Environmental
Impact’ and ‘Safety’
Solidarity
Environmental Impact
Safety
In terms of Future Life Preservation, A dominated in Safety and
C dominated in Environmental Impact. To resolve such a conflict,
the unicriterion model was applied, and it became clear to the deci-
sion maker that there was a qualitative difference between the cri-
teria which he used to rank them. The safety criterion contributed
to the future life preservation of one family in particular – the deci-
sion maker’s family – while the Environmental Impact criterion con-
tributed to the future life preservation of all the families. This led
to the unicriterion ordering represented in figure 5, and as a conse-
quence, to the preference of C over A in terms of ‘Future Life Preser-
vation.’
In terms of Capacity and Quality of Transport, A dominated in
Comfort and C dominated in Space. In this situation, however, it was
not necessary to apply the unicriterion model concept, since the de-
cision maker directly stated prefering alternative A to C considering
both criteria – he did not need the extra space that much – eliminat-
ing the apparent criteria conflict. Figure 6 resumes the ranking of
both alternatives with the new criteria.
After returning to step 2 (2.), in step 3 (3.) for obvious reasons
of convenience one aggregates the criteria Efficiency and Capac-
ity and Quality of Transport in one new criterion entitled Transport
Functionalities, that represents the direct transport advantages to
the user. Steps 4 (4.), 2 (2.) and 3 (3.) come straightforward with the
consideration of a new virtual criterion that aggregates Transport
Functionalities and Future Life preservation.
Efficiency Future Life
Preservation
Capacity and Quality
of Transport
A
C
C
A
A
C
figure 6 Ranking alternatives A and C with the new criterion
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One proceeds to the ranking of alternatives in the new virtual cri-
teria (4.). At this point the decision maker faces the problem of de-
ciding between alternative A – that excels in ‘Transport Functional-
ities’ – and alternative C – that excels in ‘Future Life Preservation.’
Since the decision maker is unable to establish a preference between
the value differences of the alternatives in each criterion, there is a
decision problem and one proceeds to the application of the uni-
criterion model. The task was facilitated by the previous value ‘ac-
quisition’ process, which is typical of a constructivist approach and
suggested the use of the already familiar point of view of ‘Delay of
Gratification.’ According to this point of view, the criterion ‘Future
Life Preservation’ was found more important than ‘Transport Func-
tionalities.’
Since there are no more criteria pairs to order or conflicting crite-
ria for these alternatives, step 2 (2.) comes after step 4 (2.) and the
process ends in step 1 leading to the selection of alternative C as the
overall best one (assuming transitivity holds).
a real decision problem
To emphasize how the proposed method brings ethics into decision
making by appealing to values more deeply rooted in every persons
moral system of preferences and beliefs (whether we are talking of
ethically sensitive problems or not) the methodology was applied in
a real decision making situation: a house investment decision with
three alternatives and six criteria described in table 3, as faced in
real life by the author and his family at the time of this paper’s writ-
ing. The appearance of this decision problem is due to the upcoming
birth of this family’s third child. The decision is somehow connected
to the school enrolment decision for our oldest son’s coming 5th year
since only one of the house locations (Alto da Barra) gives access
to a public school with a minimum of quality. The other two house
locations determine the enrolment in a private school (better then
the public one according to school rankings) and an increase in ex-
penses.
Since the method has already been illustrated by the first decision
problem, we will simply present a brief exposition of the decision
conflicts undergone and solutions found.
Comparing alternatives A and B we, verify that A excels in ‘Area
inside’, while B excels in all other criteria (except for the ‘Best avail-
able and affordable school grade’ that makes no difference). The fol-
lowing criteria aggregation has been made:
To have more than 100 square metres of area available inside the
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table 3 Evaluation of three house investment alternatives according
to several criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A Buy 35 year
old flat in Paço
de Arcos
200 BC 170 3.65 Good Average Average
(balcony)
B Expand
present house
indoor area by
closing porch
300 BC 100 3.65 Excellent Good Very good
(court and
small gar-
den)
C Buy used flat
in Alto da
Barra
400 BC 117 3.22 Good Average Average
(balcony)
Column headings are as follows: (1) alternatives/criteria, (2) monthly income left-
over after expenses, (3) area inside (square metres), (4) best available and affordable
school grade (0 to 5), localization (shops, surroundings and services proximity), (5)
house investment (what will the investment be worth in a few years), (6) area outside
the house.
house is seen as a need, while the other criteria (provided the alter-
native A level in them is guaranteed) measure the extent to which B
provides more comfort.
Since according to the criterion ‘Comfort’, alternative B is better
than A and according to ‘Needs’ it is the other way around, we ap-
plied a ranking of these two criteria in the new dimension of Human
priorities, according to which Needs are more important to be guar-
anteed than Comfort.
Alternative A is therefore more attractive than alternative B.
Comparing now alternatives A and C, they are the same in half of
the criteria. In the other half, A excels in ‘Best available and afford-
able school grade’ and ‘Area Inside’, while C is better in ‘Monthly
income leftover after expenses.’
This time ‘Area inside’ is not considered to contribute to satisfy-
ing a need but to increasing house comfort since alternative C level
Confort Needs
Money Savings
Monthly
Inc. Left.
House In-
vestment
House Comfort
Localization
Area
Outs.
Area Inside
figure 7 Criteria aggregation to compare alternatives A and B
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figure 8
Unicriterion model that ranks
criteria ‘Needs’ and ‘Comfort’
Human priorities
Needs
Comfort
Money Savings
Monthly Income
Leftover
House Comfort
Inside Area
Education
Best Available and
Afford. School Grade
figure 9 Criteria aggregation to compare alternatives A and C
in this criterion (117 square meters) is already considered to be the
minimum to satisfy future needs (an extra room). Therefore, the ag-
gregated criteria now become the ones presented in figure 9.
Figure 10 resumes the ranking of both alternatives with the new
aggregated criteria.
Since the comparison between the criteria Money savings and
Education in light of the new Unicriterion concern of ‘Raising au-
tonomous children’ indicates that it is better to prepare (educate)
someone to make a living on his (her) with own than to keep provid-
ing him (her) living expenses in the future (through present money
savings), then alternative A is preferable to C even without having
to account for the House Comfort criteria.
As a conclusion we therefore found that alternative A – ‘Buy a 35
year old flat in Paço de Arcos’ is the one we prefer.
Discussion
Figure 12 depicts the car purchase decision process, the one that
illustrates the method in more detail. Unlike the normal decision
Money savings House Comfort Education
C
A
A
C
A
C
figure 10 Ranking alternatives A and C with the new criteria
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figure 11
Unicriteria model that ranks
criteria ‘Education’ and
‘Money savings’
Raising Autonomous
Children
Education
Money Savings
criteria, unicriterion models or points of view are represented be-
tween two arrows, one of them pointing out in the direction of the
winning criteria. As expected, the decision model exhibits a pyra-
mid like structure, and it is possible to enunciate a simple high-level
reason for why alternative A was selected – a choice of gratification
delay was made. Going down the value tree one can find the value
structure adopted, which identifies the major decision conflicts un-
dergone and solutions found. By doing this it is interesting to note
that the environmental impact criterion turned out to be dominat-
ing in the decision, which can be attributed to the Solidarity point of
view adopted.
Given the criteria modelling flavour of the method, Keeney’s work
(Keeney 1992, 29–152) might be considered a framework within
which to compare this procedure. In a way, the Unicriterion model
also follows a value – focused thinking approach, but where the
fundamental objectives come out of a later step of the method appli-
cation, from the alternatives comparison in a bottom – up procedure.
The low-level criteria are similar to Keeney’s attributes that mea-
sure the extent to which a certain objective is reached. As we pro-
gressively aggregate these criteria in the method, the higher level
ones become fundamental objectives. For simplicity and operational
reasons we do not distinguish between these different level crite-
ria/objectives by calling them all criteria. There is, however, a differ-
ent kind of criteria that we distinguish from all the others: the crite-
ria or points of view that solve the conflicts between criteria. These
we call the Unicriterion, following the name of the model that they
provide.
This approach lends a quite more active role to the analyst and the
decision maker, since they are the ones to perceive the ‘good’ criteria
aggregation and conflict solution opportunities. This means that the
subjective part of the decision making process is entirely delivered
to the human minds involved.
While building on a qualitative perspective, different from the
one typically adopted in multicriteria applications, since the deci-
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figure 12 Car acquisition decision value structure
sion maker is asked to structure and eventually modify his prefer-
ences along the process, the Unicriterion Model hereby presented
follows a rather constructivist approach, currently advocated among
practitioners.
Given the unusual approach adopted towards the decision making
problem, quite radical in its qualitative terms in comparison to other
procedures, it seems appropriate to note that if the outstanding ca-
pabilities of humans indicate we are a product of intelligent ‘decision
making’, and if we cannot say how many times we prefer one thing
to another, maybe that is because when it comes to decisions we are
made to think more in terms of values and less in terms of numbers.
Conclusions
This research attempted to find a way to go beyond some limits of the
traditional models of criteria weights determination and aggrega-
tion used in multicriteria decision making methods, that have some
shortcomings in developing and clarifying the rationale behind its
results.
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To accomplish this, the decision criteria were selected as the deci-
sion process items to be looked at from a different perspective, since
the priorities established between them are the model – or the rea-
son – that determines why some alternatives will be preferred.
Accordingly, the suggested approach was to put the emphasis on
the criteria modelling part of the problem, through the application
of a criteria aggregation and ordering qualitative procedure. Once
applied in the algorithmic manner described in the method section
such a procedure progressively orders pairs of alternatives.
The focus of the developed method was on solving every unavoid-
able conflict between criteria pairs, not through the quantification
of a relative importance in the decision maker’s mind but through
the identification of a reason – a point of view – according to which
he/she prefers one criterion to another.
The method was tested through its application to two different
decision problems: one hypothetical (for illustration of the method)
and the other a real one. The results of the experience showed that
the method is viable and reaches its purpose of identifying the points
of view behind preference conflict solutions found in the course of
the decision analysis.
Given the amount of analyses it requires, the method is not rec-
ommended for application in decision problems with many alterna-
tives or criteria. It could however be helpful as a reality check for the
relative importance of the best performing ones in traditional quan-
titative multicriteria applications, considering only the most relevant
criteria.
The fact that the method helps clarifying the values and the rea-
sons for their relative importance on the basis of the decision, makes
it particularly appealing to promote ethics in decision making. With
this method one can not hide decisions behind numerical combina-
tions of criteria weights. Instead, there is a simple and transparent
solution to each preference conflict.
Given the qualitative nature of the procedure, it might be particu-
larly appropriate to support personal decision making, which is less
demanding from the point of view of quantitative rigor (let us re-
call that public evaluation of proposals sometimes requires a priori
quantification of criteria weights) and is more likely prone to a per-
sonal value or subjective moral foundation of decisions. As a curios-
ity, we can mention that the author of this paper has already him-
self applied this method successfully some years ago to help decide
whether to enrol his son in a public or private school.
We have identified two limitations of the study. One is that the ver-
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ification of the ideas here presented through real case applications
in a scale statistically relevant is still to be achieved. The other one
is that since the author of the paper (together with his wife in the
house purchase decision) played the role of both the decision maker
and the analyst in the two decision problems considered, such co-
incidence made a successful application easier to attain, dismissing
probable communication gaps between the decision process actors.
As future work, besides going beyond the study limitations, it could
be meaningful to try to identify types or patterns of criteria pairs
preference ordering and aggregation procedures, to facilitate and
make these operations more reliable in the method.
Another interesting goal to purse would be to conduct the experi-
ment proposed to test hypothesis 1 and draw some conclusions.
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